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1. At the crossroads
After a thirty-year pause, discussions about the future of the international monetary system 
(henceforth IMS or 'the system') have restarted. An increasing number of observers is arguing 
that the system has facilitated, or at least not prevented, the rise of economic and financial 
imbalances that are at the origin of the recent crisis.  Meanwhile,  due to market forces and 
policy action, the system has evolved in recent years and more changes are likely in the near 
future.  The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  outline  some  of  these  developments  and  to  discuss 
foreseeable implications for Europe.
Before 2007, some had already noted the peculiar configuration that the post-Bretton Woods 
system  had  assumed,  with  China  and  the  US  increasingly  unbalanced  in  their  external 
positions and with a common interest  on their  part  to postpone or  even avoid adjustment 
(Dooley,  Folkerts  Landau and Garber,  2004).  With  the crisis,  concerns about  this  situation 
have increased. Three things happened. First, analyses of the mechanisms driving the supply 
and demand for risky assets in the pre-crisis years have shed light on the links between the 
expansion  of  global  liquidity  and  the  propensity  by  wealth  holders  and  banks  to  take  on 
leverage and risk (see, for example, Adrian and Shin, 2008). A connection with the IMS arises 
because the hegemonic position of the US dollar, in combination with the expansionary stance 
of the US monetary policy, is often recognised as an indirect cause of the rising supply of 
international liquidity in the years preceding the outburst of the crisis (as argued, for example, 
by  Gourinchas,  2010).  Second,  the  depreciation  of  the  dollar  and  the  ensuing  search  for 
portfolio  diversification  by  official  reserve  holders  accelerated  a  demand-driven  evolution 
towards a 'multipolar' IMS (at least if measured at current exchange rates; ECB (b) provides 
evidence).  On the supply  side,  China has made tentative steps to  encourage some cross-
border use of its currency. Finally, the growing evidence that global imbalances are not going 
to go away, even once the global economy were to emerge from the crisis,  has injected a 
sense of 'quid agendum' among policymakers.
Clearly, the fact that there are discussions does not ipso facto mean that reform will actually 
happen. It does not even mean that the current market-driven evolution (that we will describe 
in  some  detail  below)  will  lead  to  a  discernibly  distinct  endpoint  in  a  foreseeable  future. 
History is not encouraging in this respect. The extensive debate in the 1960s and 1970s on 
the weaknesses of the dollar-centred fixed rates system and its possible alternatives did not 
lead anywhere, except in its dissolution (forty years ago as we write) and replacement with 
what was later dubbed, dismissively, a 'non- system'. By contrast, a monetary order bound to 
last for decades was delivered in a three-week secluded conference (1-22 July, 1944), with 
little contribution from outside experts or public opinions. Can this time be different? Perhaps. 
It is significant that in addition to discussions there are, at present, powerful economic forces 
at work that should plausibly propel further changes, on top of those we already see today.
Our scope in this piece is twofold. First, we review the main recent developments in the IMS 
and possible future trends in the medium term, including the role of China and its currency. 
Here we draw mainly on a recent report by Bruegel and CEPII that we co-authored with others 
(Angeloni et al, 2011), in which these trends are examined in more depth. Second, we discuss 
the  position  of  the  euro  in  the  context  of  these  developments.  Discussing  prospects 
concerning the international role of the euro may seem hazardous at the present time, when 
some are prophesying its demise. While not underestimating these risks, we contend that the 
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prospects  are  not  necessarily  as  grim  as  they  appear  at  present.  Our  focus  is  on  the 
fundamental forces that will, assuming the current tensions subside, shape the position of the 
euro within different possible scenarios for the evolution of the IMS in foreseeable future.
We make three main points:
1. The international position of the US dollar is going to erode further, though the speed of 
the process is uncertain.  This will  create a demand for other currencies to be used 
internationally as means of payment and store of value1. The real question is how this 
vacuum will be filled.
2. Barring a resurgence of monetary multilateralism, leading, for example, to a revival of 
the SDR – eventuality we regard as implausible except in case of major crises – the 
most  realistic  scenario  is  one  in  which  other  currencies  will  come  to  share  the 
privilege,  and  the  burden,  of  exercising  an  international  role.  Both  the  Chinese 
renminbi  (RMB)  and  the  euro  are  partially  qualified  to  play  this  role,  alone  or  in 
combination, and are bound to compete for that role. The outcome will depend on a 
mix of circumstances and policies.
3. The prospects for the euro are challenging but far from hopeless. As others, we are of 
the view that the euro crisis will be overcome only with further radical steps towards 
fiscal and financial integration. While it seems unclear at present whether the political 
cohesion and leadership necessary for such steps can materialise, one should note 
that,  historically,  political  and  economic  unifications  have  typically  progressed  in 
times of crisis. The euro is at a risky crossroads, but what matters for our argument 
here is that the reforms needed to stabilise it internally – some of which are already in 
progress – are the same ones that  would promote  its  international  attractiveness. 
Internal stabilisation, if achieved, is likely to be matched by a growing international 
strength. 
2. The IMS and the crisis
The current system, or ‘non-system’ as some call it, emerged from the ashes of the Bretton 
Woods regime in the early 1970s. Its emergence was accompanied by major policy reforms at 
national level that, taken together, gave rise to the current international financial architecture, 
which  is  made  of  widespread  financial  liberalisation,  the  generalisation  of  central  bank 
independence,  policy  regimes  aimed  at  delivering  domestic  stability  and  the  gradual 
acceptance  of  exchange-rate  fluctuations.  For  many  observers  and  policy  players  it  was 
deemed to be not just the only viable system, but also the most desirable one. A system of 
generalised  floating  and flexible  inflation-targeting  with  full  capital  mobility,  at  least  in  the 
advanced world,  seemed well  suited to  achieving  policymakers’  goals  of  full  employment, 
stable prices and sustainable current-account positions. In this setting, their main task was to 
‘keep their own house in order’ (generally intended as some notion of internal balance: low 
inflation and near-full  resource utilisation).  International  coherence was expected to result 
from the consistency of national self-centred policy rules.
1 A different view is presented by Kenen (2011), according to whom “There are no alternatives to the present 
role of the dollar in the international monetary system”.
2
Gradually, however, this hope dissipated as the two assumptions on which it rested became 
untenable. First, macroeconomic policies by the key players were meant to remain disciplined 
and consistent with maintaining the system in balance. This was obviously not the case for the 
United States whose currency retained a central role in the system giving it the ‘exorbitant 
privilege’  of  easy  external  deficit  financing  and  seignorage  extraction.  Second,  countries 
outside the advanced world, often unable or unwilling to abide by the system of generalised 
floating  and flexible  inflation-targeting  with  full  capital  mobility  and were once a relatively 
marginal component of the global economy, have become major players.
As a result, in recent years the IMS has undergone a transition, the most important one since 
the end of Bretton Woods. The conditions for change were already in place before the crisis, as 
a result of a number of factors.
The first is the trend decline in the weight of the US in the global economy. This movement is 
clearly underway and will continue, or even accelerate, as we document below. History shows 
that monetary dominance is persistent: currencies tend to preserve their international role for 
long  after  the  decline of  the  respective  economy  (Flandreau  and Jobst,  2009).  Over  time, 
however, economic size and performance become increasingly relevant in the attractiveness 
of a currency for global investors.
In addition, the position of the US dollar has been threatened by the uncertainties connected 
with the growing external imbalance of the US economy. US deficits contributed to the supply 
of dollars in the global economy, hence initially supporting the position of the hegemon, but 
over  time  they  generated  doubts  about  the  sustainability  of  such  position  –  the  time-
honoured  and  still  valid  Triffin  (1960)  dilemma  –  and  a  growing  demand  for  portfolio 
diversification.  The financial crisis has accelerated this evolution.  Perceived risks in the US 
banking system and sovereign debt have fuelled the demand for diversification by private and 
official wealth holders. The weakness of the US dollar has intensified, except for a short-lived 
'safe haven effect' during the first phases of the turmoil.
Another contributing factor is the transformation of Asia, since the end of the 1990s, from a 
chronic  state  of  underdevelopment  into  a  thriving,  competitive  and  highly  interconnected 
economic  region.  The  web  of  financial  and  trade  linkages  across  the  region  has  grown 
exponentially (Kubelek and Sa, 2010). Though a regional 'monetary pole' has not emerged yet, 
the conditions for one arising are increasingly present. China, the largest regional economy, 
while still hesitant on whether such developments should be encouraged, has nonetheless 
moved some steps towards developing an international role for its currency (Vallee, 2011).
Since 2005, and increasingly after 2008, China has adopted a more flexible exchange rate 
stance, something that is seen by many as a sign of further steps towards an open monetary 
and  financial  system,  including  more  cross-border  use  of  the  RMB  within  the  region. 
Interestingly, Fratzscher and Mehl (2011) document a sharp increase in the influence exerted 
by the Chinese currency on other regional exchange rates, starting after the softening of the 
dollar peg in 2005 and particularly after the financial turmoil of 2008. These authors go as far 
as suggesting that the renminbi may already have acquired, unnoticed by most, the status of 
an international currency. 
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Furthermore,  dissatisfaction  with  capital  flows  volatility  has  revived  the  debate  about  the 
costs and benefits of free capital mobility. The general consensus established in the 1990s 
about the benefits of financial globalisation has been undermined, not only because of the 
crisis but also,  and more simply,  because many emerging countries have been repeatedly 
overwhelmed by surges of capital inflows followed by sudden outflows. Also, many of them, 
including  China and India,  have demonstrated that  they could perform economically  while 
retaining tight capital controls. 
The accumulation of very large international reserves by still relatively poor countries raises 
concerns  about  the  welfare  cost  of  holding  reserves  and  capital  allocation  at  global  level. 
Foreign-exchange reserves are mostly invested in high-quality and low-yielding liquid assets, 
mainly government bonds. Such an investment strategy has welfare costs for countries that 
accumulate reserves and has implications for international capital flows that are undesirable 
from an allocative viewpoint. It also has consequences for global financial stability, because it 
increases  the  burden  of  diversification  and  maturity  transformation  on  banking  sectors 
located in the reserve currency countries – mainly the US. Moreover, there is a growing fear 
among large official reserves holders that the present system exposes them to the risk of large 
capital  losses,  should  the  dollar  depreciate  in  a  disorderly  way.  In  brief,  foreign-exchange 
reserves accumulation does, beyond a certain point, offer an unfavourable risk-return trade-off 
and maybe a source of negative global externalities. Rising concerns in the developing and 
emerging world were vividly exposed in a widely commented post by China’s  central  bank 
governor in March 2009 (Zhou, 2009), in which he unexpectedly called for a reform of the IMS 
based on a revival of the Special Drawing Rights (SDR). 
Finally, increasing disputes over the pegging strategies of emerging countries, and monetary 
policies  in  the  advanced  countries,  emphasise  the  increasingly  evident  need  for  an 
emancipation of monetary policies in large emerging countries. The process started before the 
crisis with the adoption of inflation-targeting monetary policy strategies by many emerging 
economies.  However,  fear  of  floating  and lack  of  international  cooperation  led  many other 
countries to maintain the objective of a stable exchange rate and to sterilise the monetary 
consequences  of  increased net  capital  inflows.  In  the wake of  the crisis,  the large growth 
differential  between  the  ‘North’  and  the  ‘South’  has  made  such  double-target  model 
unworkable without raising barriers to capital flows. These developments have also prompted 
fears of ‘currency wars’.
The  common  theme  running  through  these  developments  is  the  recognition  that  current 
international monetary arrangements seem incapable of delivering not only domestic internal 
and  external stability  for  each  individual  country,  but  also  global  economic  and  financial 
stability.  A  broadly  shared,  though  not  unanimous,  opinion  among  academics  (see  for 
example Eichengreen, 2009; Portes, 2009) and policymakers (see de Larosière, 2009; Turner, 
2009;  and King,  2010) is that the interplay between external imbalances among the main 
currency areas and financial market developments was an essential ingredient in the genesis 
of the crisis. There is also broad (but again not unanimous) recognition that macro-imbalances 
were  facilitated  by  the  lack  of  incentives  for  policy  adjustment  and  the  weakness  of 
multilateral disciplines. Whether the uneasiness about the performance of the system – well 
articulated  by  the  report  of  the  Palais-Royal  initiative  (Camdessus  et  al,  2011)  – and  the 
ensuing  discussions  will  lead  to  reform  action  soon,  or  will  lose  force  in  the  face  of  the 
formidable negotiating difficulties that any reform of international monetary relations entails, 
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is difficult to predict. Sceptics point out that agreements on overhauls of the IMS were only 
reached in exceptional circumstances, typically following major wars2.
All in all, there are in our view reasons to believe that, despite the fact that (1) its role in the 
genesis of the global crisis remains controversial, (2) it proved fairly resilient during the crisis 
and (3)  it  will  be hard to  reform,  the current  IMS is  bound to evolve through either  policy 
initiatives  or  market  developments,  or  probably  both.  The  two  main  factors  that  have 
contributed to the preservation of the status quo in the last three decades – the uncontested 
dominant position of the US economy and the absence of plausible candidates to join the US 
dollar in its international role – are gradually eroding. What is much less clear at present is 
what direction this evolution will take, say, over a horizon of 10 to 15 years from now.  
3. Realistic options for the foreseeable future
To design possible medium-term scenarios for the evolution of the IMS, it is useful to examine 
the structural factors that shape the global monetary order, their balance and how they are 
likely  to  develop  over  time.  Following  Angeloni  et  al (2011),  we distinguish  three shaping 
factors. 
The first is the sheer economic size of nations. Throughout the history of the IMS there has 
been a link (albeit a complex one) between economic size and monetary leadership, with the 
complexity coming from the fact that incumbency matters because of ‘network externalities’ 
associated with the international use of currencies. A similar tension between economic size 
and incumbency is likely to apply in the decades to come as well, suggesting that the impact 
of economic size on monetary power, while surely present, is likely to be delayed.
Figure 1 provides a bird's eye view of the evolution of the world economy and the distribution 
of economic power from 1870 to 2050, at 2005 exchange rates. Throughout the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, the share of the largest economy in world GDP remained consistently 
above  15  percent.  For  most  of  the  Gold  Standard  period  (1879-1913),  the  sterling  area 
composed of the UK and its main colonies met this criterion. It was either the dominant power 
in terms of GDP or a close second to the US. Throughout the Bretton Woods period (1945-
1973), the US was the undisputed dominant power, with a weight consistently over one-fourth 
of world GDP. 
According to long-term projections, the world economy in the twenty-first century is likely to 
see the emergence of two new dominant players3: China and India. China should overtake the 
US  around  2035,  at  constant  relative  prices (Subramanian,  2011,  offers  a  comprehensive 
account of the progress of China). By the middle of the century, US weight should be down to 
less than 20 percent and, unless significant enlargements take place, the eurozone’s weight 
will be down to 10 percent. Even assuming enlargement of the euro area to the current EU and 
beyond, its weight is unlikely to reach 15 percent. In contrast, China could weigh one fourth of 
the global economy at the 2050 horizon, and India almost as much as the euro area. In the 
2 The Smithsonian Agreement of 1971, that simply took note of the unilateral decision by the US Government to 
end the Bretton Woods system, is hardly an exception.
3 The projections in this paragraph are from Fouré et al (2010) and are based on assumptions about 
demography and productivity.
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meantime  – say,  in the next  10 to  20 years – there  will  be an interregnum  during which 
economic power will be much more evenly distributed amongst a core group of countries.
Figure 1: Percentage shares of selected countries and areas in world GDP, 1870-2050 (at 
2005 exchange rates)
Sources: see Angeloni et al (2011). 
The second factor has to do with the ability of a country or a group of countries to exercise 
monetary leadership. Beyond economic size, this ability depends on financial development, 
on  the  quality  of  economic  and  financial  institutions,  on  the  nature  and  effectiveness  of 
governance, and on an economic power’s political might and commitment to global leadership. 
Table 1 summarises the respective situations of the US dollar, the euro and the renminbi with 
respect to these elements.
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Table 1: The incumbent and the challengers: state of play in 2011
US dollar Euro Renminbi
Size 27% of world GDP, 
decreasing
20% of world GDP, 
decreasing (but potential 
for enlargement)
7.6% of world GDP, 
increasing
Financial markets and 
openness
Unrivalled liquidity and 
depth, full capital 
mobility 
Second after the US, but 
bond markets remain 
fragmented in the 
absence of unified 
Eurobonds. Full capital 
mobility
Underdeveloped markets 
and restricted capital 
mobility
Legal system Strong Strong Weak
Budgetary and 
monetary policy
Increasing concerns over 
the sustainability of 
budgetary policy and the 
risks of debt 
monetisation
Strong monetary record 
and institutional 
independence. Concerns 
over solvency of some 
individual state borrowers
Strong fiscal position. Good 
monetary policy track 
record but at risk, in part 
because of currency peg
Ability /willingness of 
policy system to 
respond to unexpected 
shocks, lender of last 
resort function
Strong Strong for central bank 
but broader capacity 
limited by institutional 
arrangements
Strong
Stance towards 
international currency 
role
Incumbent Officially neutral. 
Unilateral euroisation by 
non-member countries 
actively discouraged
Support for early steps of 
RMB internationalisation
Political cohesion and 
geopolitical power 
Strong Limited by political 
fragmentation
Strong and in ascendance 
Source: Angeloni et al (2011).
The table indicates that there are several reasons why the dollar is dominant at the moment. 
Its main, not negligible, weakness arises from concerns over the sustainability of budgetary 
policy and the possible monetary consequences of debt  unsustainability.  The dollar  faces 
however two potential rivals. The first, the euro, has many of the attributes of an international 
currency and already a sizeable share in foreign exchange reserves and international bond 
issuances,  but  weak  governance  and  political  foundations.  The  second  potential  rival,  the 
renminbi,  has  strong  underpinnings  in  terms  of  economic  potential  and  coherence  in 
policymaking  but  is  still  far  from  having  acquired  the  characteristics  of  an  international 
currency. In short, for the time being the euro will not be dominant and the renminbi cannot, 
and this gives the dollar a still-unrivalled status. But this situation is unlikely to last beyond 
the 10-15 year horizon considered here. 
The third factor relates to the likely evolution of global financial conditions. A major question is 
whether  the  trend  towards  global  financial  integration  observed  in  the  last  decades  will 
continue and lead to the full inclusion of emerging countries into the global financial network. 
The appetite  for  unfettered capital  market liberalisation has significantly  diminished  in the 
wake of the 1997-98 Asian crisis and of the more recent global crisis. An increasing number of 
emerging economies have reintroduced capital  controls or are contemplating such a move, 
often with explicit or implicit support from the IMF. The resumption of capital flows after the 
worse  of  the  global  crisis  was  over  nevertheless  suggests  that  these  controls  were  more 
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defensive than offensive; they convey a more cautious approach to liberalisation by emerging 
and developing countries rather than an irreversible U-turn. Meanwhile, Asian financial centres 
have continued to strengthen, and their openness and integration have increased.
A separate issue concerns the direction of capital flows. A striking characteristic of the last 
decade is that, in net terms, while private capital has been flowing ‘downhill’, from relatively 
richer to relatively poorer countries, official reserve hoarding has reversed the direction of total 
net flows ‘uphill’. Although they abated somewhat in the aftermath of the global crisis, there 
are reasons to believe that ‘South-North’ capital flows are going to remain strong and that the 
world saving-investment balance pattern is not going to reverse dramatically over the next 10-
15 years4.
Based on these observations, there seems to be three scenarios for the IMS in the foreseeable 
future, say the next 10-15 years:
1. A  repair-and-improve  scenario  whereby  changes  to  current  arrangements  are 
introduced through incremental reforms. These are inter alia enhanced surveillance, a 
voluntary  reform  of  exchange-rate  arrangements,  especially  in  Asia;  improved 
international  liquidity  facilities;  accompanying  domestic  reforms  such  as  the 
development  of  home-currency  financial  markets;  and  regional  initiatives  to 
complement current IMF facilities.  Under this scenario, the international role of key 
currencies remains broadly constant and the US dollar retains its dominant role, the 
euro’s  role  remains  broadly  unchanged,  and  the  one  of  the  Chinese  renminbi 
increases, but remains marginal in comparison to the dollar and the euro.
2. A multipolar scenario in which a system structured around two or three international 
currencies - the dollar and, presumably, the euro and/or the renminbi – emerges over 
a 10-15 year horizon. Although a move to a multipolar system is generally viewed as a 
remote prospect, especially in the case of the renminbi, it would be entirely consistent 
with the long-run evolution of the world economy. Moreover, the Chinese authorities 
have  taken  significant  steps  in  this  direction  through  various  schemes  and  their 
currency has a strong potential for internationalisation. As for the euro, it has already 
developed as a diversification currency and in this scenario the euro area overcomes 
its current difficulties and the euro graduates from a mainly regional to a truly global 
currency. Yet an alternative bipolar scenario with the dollar and the renminbi could 
occur if the euro remains handicapped economically and politically.
3. A  multilateral  scenario  in  which  participants  agree  to  take  steps  towards  a 
strengthened international monetary order. In contrast with the multipolar scenario, 
which will largely rely on market forces and national policies, renewed multilateralism 
would  require  a  fairly  intense  degree  of  international  coordination  and  the 
development of new instruments to help escape the pitfalls of regimes based on the 
dominant role of one or a few national currencies, foster macroeconomic discipline 
and provide for international liquidity management. A system of this sort could build 
on the existing SDR or rely on other, new vehicles. 
Compared  with  the  current  regime,  each  of  these  three  scenarios  has  advantages  and 
disadvantages in terms of efficiency,  stability and equity.  It  has also its own specificity in 
4 See Chapter 3 of the April 2011 IMF World Economic Outlook.
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terms of feasibility. Table 2 provides an assessment of the three scenarios in terms of these 
four criteria.
Table 2: Assessing the three scenarios
Criterion Scenario 1 
Repair and improve
Scenario 2 
Multipolarity
Scenario 3 
Renewed multilateralism
Efficiency 
Economies of scale 0 - 0/- 
Savings on reserve 
accumulation 
+ ++ +++ 
Limitation of FX 
misalignments
+ ++ ++
Stability 
Global anchor 0 ? + 
Discipline + ++ +++ 
Limitation of FX volatility 0 - - 
Resilience to shocks + + ++
Equity 
Adjustment symmetry + ++ +++ 
Limitation of exorbitant 
privilege 
0 + ++ 
Global seignorage 0 + + 
Limitation of policy 
spillovers
+ ++ +++
Feasibility +++ ++ + 
(*) Gains (+) or losses (-) are those implied by moving from the current IMS to each of the alternative regimes. 
Source: Angeloni et al (2011).
The first scenario is the least demanding in terms of both domestic policies and international 
coordination, hence is the most likely in the short run. The third one is the most demanding in 
terms of both domestic policies and international coordination, and therefore the least likely in 
the  foreseeable  future,  unless  serious  shocks  in  the  global  economy  (e.g.  a  deep  and 
prolonged  recession,  disorderly  exchange  rate  and  asset  price  movements,  financial 
instability  and  contagion,  or  any  combinations  thereof)  stark  recession  force  a  quantum 
increase  in  the  degree  of  international  economic  and  monetary  cooperation.  The  second 
scenario  relies  on  market  forces,  geo-political  trends  and  domestic  policies  rather  than 
international cooperation. Its probability is low in the short run, but significant at the 10-15 
year horizon.
In  terms  of  efficiency,  stability  and  equity,  all  three  scenarios  offer  improvements  when 
compared to the current system. Comparing the three scenarios to each other, we find that 
that the desirability of a scenario seems to be negatively correlated to its feasibility, at least in 
the  short  run.  The  multipolar  and  the multilateral  scenarios  are both  superior  to  the  more 
modest ‘repair-and-improve’ scenario, especially on grounds of equity and, to some extent, 
stability, although their pros and cons vary across the different criteria. But they are also less 
likely in the short run precisely because they are more demanding in terms of domestic or 
international policies. 
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More  extreme  multilateral  scenarios  involving  the  creation  of  an  ‘outside’  international 
currency in a proper sense (modelled for example on Keynes’ bancor)  rather than simply the 
SDR – a scenario envisaged recently by Padoa-Schioppa (2010) would be preferable in our 
view, at least theoretically, as they would guarantee a fully symmetric adjustment mechanism 
and full control of global reserves. Admittedly, however, they are even far less realistic than 
the more modest multilateral scenario considered here.
If feasibility in the medium term is the main guiding principle, then the multipolar scenario is 
clearly the most interesting to explore since it best corresponds to the structural changes in 
the world economy discussed earlier, in particular the role of China.
It should be emphasised, though, that the gains from multipolarity can only materialise if key 
currencies are truly allowed to float (although maybe in a managed way), and if third countries 
move  towards  more  flexibility  or  regional  pegs.  Here  the  key  question  concerns  the 
internationalisation of the renminbi and whether it will  make exchange rate flexibility more 
acceptable for both China and its regional partners. 
4. A key question: the role of China
There  are  several  reasons to  assume  that  the  renminbi  will  become  a  major  international 
currency. As the second largest economy in the world, China already has the scale necessary 
to create deep and liquid financial markets. The huge size of its foreign trade and foreign direct 
investment volume forms the basis for renminbi-denominated transactions. In addition, the 
People’s Bank of China (PBC) and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) have 
large balance sheets and already actively intervene in on- and off-shore financial markets. 
Moreover,  importantly,  as  Eichengreen  (2010)  argues,  the  rise  of  the  renminbi  to  a  fuller 
international  status  will  be  advantageous  to  China.  Besides  the  extraction  of  seignorage, 
domestic  firms  would  be  able  to  limit  their  foreign  exchange  exposures  by  transacting 
internationally in their own currency, the PBC will be able to follow an independent monetary 
policy and China’s financial sector will become more competitive.
At the moment, however, the internationalisation of the renminbi remains very limited, even 
compared to currencies of other emerging countries. Cheung, Ma and McCauley (2010) show 
that,  in 2007, daily trading of the renminbi barely surpassed the sum of daily imports and 
exports from China, whereas foreign exchange turnover in relation to foreign trade was around 
10 for the Indian rupee or the Korean won and roughly 100 for international currencies such as 
the Swiss franc or the US dollar.
There are, clearly, formidable obstacles that must be overcome before China’s currency gains 
international status, which presupposes capital account convertibility – the ability to freely 
convert  domestic  into  foreign  financial  assets  at  market  determined  exchange  rates.  They 
include the quality of financial regulation and supervision, the degree of the rule of law, the 
exchange rate policy and the strong reliance on exports. These obstacles are all interrelated 
and overcoming them will amount to a fundamental change in China’s economic model. Barry 
Eichengreen argues that  “these kinds of changes are coming.  While  one can question the  
timing – whether Shanghai will have become a true international financial centre by 2020 [as  
China’s  State  Council  has  announced]  and  whether  the  renminbi  will  be  a  first-rank  
10
international currency by that date – one cannot question the direction” (Eichengreen, 2010, 
pp. 6-7). 
Indeed the central question about the internationalisation of the renminbi is one of timing, 
which is a key factor behind the different scenarios for the evolution of the IMS over the next 
10-15 years discussed in the previous section.
In scenario 1, it is assumed that China gradually aligns its monetary regime on those of other 
Asian emerging  countries,  which can be characterised  by  ‘dirty’  float  and a limited  use of 
capital  controls.  Building  on its  experience  with the  creation  of  an offshore market  for  the 
renminbi, it continues to foster the international role of its currency, but at a gradual pace.
By contrast,  scenario 2 assumes that  China moves at  a more sustained pace towards the 
internationalisation of its currency. Changes are initially gradual (for example, we suppose an 
extension  of  the  ‘pilot’  project  of  renminbi  internationalisation  launched  in  2009,  the 
promotion of one or several active financial centres and initiatives towards increased financial 
account openness), but they create a momentum and trigger enough two-way capital mobility 
for a degree of internationalisation of the renminbi to take place despite remaining limitations 
to  capital  mobility.  Further  internationalisation  would  require  greater  capital  account 
liberalisation and a freely floating exchange rate. 
Whether or not the 15-year time horizon we envisage here would be sufficient for the renminbi 
to become a floating currency underpinned by fairly complete capital mobility and therefore to 
be fully internationalised is difficult to say. 
    
Eichengreen (2010) argues that it took only 10 years (1914 to 1924) for the US dollar to go 
from a situation where, like the renminbi today, it played a negligible role in international trade 
and payments to one where it became the leading international and reserve currency. It is not 
clear, however, whether the international circumstances would allow such a rapid rise of the 
renminbi in the coming 10 years or even whether the Chinese authorities have the will and the 
capacity  to  transform  their  economy  and,  indeed,  their  social  and  political  systems,  to  a 
sufficient extent to make that possible.     
5. Opportunities and risks for the euro
In  the  10-some  years  of  its  existence,  the  euro  has  made  only  limited  progress  in  its 
international presence. Measured by the usual yardsticks – share in global official reserves, 
use as currency anchor for exchange arrangements, denomination of foreign trade, etc – it is 
the second currency after the US dollar. But so it was already shortly after its introduction; the 
more recent years have seen little progress in this respect (see ECB (b) and Dorrucci and 
McKay, 2011). The stability of the euro’s position in the rankings of international use over the 
decade is striking in light of the diverse influences acting in opposite directions – the sharp 
depreciation  in the first  two years,  the subsequent  re-appreciation  coupled with  euro area 
enlargement, recently the financial crisis, etc. The remarkable stability of the status quo for 
many years may have been due on the one side to inertia generated by the long-standing 
dominance  of  the  US  economy  and  its  currency,  and  on  the  other  to  the  lack  of  serious 
contenders from the emerging world, on the other. Both conditions are rapidly changing.
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The  stance  of  European  policymakers  towards  the  phenomenon  has  been  ambivalent.  In 
1999, the ECB formulated a doctrine that can be labelled “watchful neglect”. According to it, the 
internationalisation  of  the  euro  is  a  market  driven  process  that  should  be  monitored,  not 
pursued ('neither fostered nor hampered' is the expression used in the ECB, 1999); it is a by-
product of other goals (price stability, financial integration), not a goal in itself. This view arose 
partly from the consideration of the potential costs and risk of an international currency, in 
terms of added volatility and vulnerability to external influences (an aspect emphasised by 
Gourinchas,  Govillot  and Rey,  2010).  Over  the years,  the ECB has  regularly  monitored  the 
euro’s usage in international markets, publishing extensive reports. On the other hand, other 
policymakers  in  Europe  have  expressed  different  nuances.  The  Commission’s  position 
seemed typically more sympathetic  (Almunia,  2008),  or  even at times expressed an open 
endorsement  (EU  Commission,  2008).  A  rather  warm  support  has  come  also  from  the 
European  Parliament  (European  Parliament,  Draft  resolutions  to  the  ECB  Annual  Report, 
various years). Among member states, different positions have been expressed, some sharing 
the 'neglect' view, others more openly sympathetic to its promotion.
Looking  ahead  two  major  questions  arise.  The  first  is  whether  the  transition  of  the  IMS 
suggests that the 'neglect' doctrine, prevailing in Europe in recent years, should be reviewed. 
The second is whether, regardless of the policy stance, those changes imply that a market-
driven acceleration of the progress in the euro’s international position is likely. Let’s consider 
the two questions in turn.
Historical experience suggests a negative answer to the first question. The British pound and 
the  US  dollar  –  the  main  global  currencies  in  the  last  two  centuries  –  acquired  their 
international position not as a result of policy actions deliberately aiming at that goal, but as a 
consequence  of  a  variety  of  economic,  financial  and  geo-political  developments  and 
conditions.  Economic  policy  may  well  help  those  conditions  materialise,  but  its  effect  on 
whether a currency is accepted across borders as a medium of exchange and used as store of 
value is mainly indirect. For example, consider the circumstances linking the creation of the 
US  Federal  Reserve  (1913)  to  the  establishment  of  the  dollar’s  international  position  in 
subsequent years (Eichengreen, 2011). The presence of a central bank at the centre of the 
then developing US financial system, guarding financial stability after the major banking crises 
of the earlier years and providing the real economy with an 'elastic currency', undoubtedly 
contributed to the rising cross-border role of the dollar after the Great War (Eichengreen and 
Flandreau, 2009 and 2010). But neither was the Fed founded to promote such role, nor was 
this a relevant consideration in the mind of Benjamin Strong or other early US central bankers. 
Different,  in our  view,  is  the answer to  the second question,  namely,  whether  the  present 
circumstances  are  more  favourable  for  the  euro  to  expand  internationally.  The  euro  has 
shown, in recent years, a considerable attractiveness at regional level, especially in Eastern 
Europe. This process possesses a built-in inertia,  which creates favourable conditions for a 
further spreading in coming years, other things equal. In addition, as we observed, there is now 
a new and genuine demand for currency diversification in the system. It is unlikely that this 
demand will  go away in the foreseeable future, on the contrary. This should create, ceteris 
paribus,  favourable  conditions  for  the  gradual  emergence  of  a  multipolar  IMS,  as we have 
argued, in which the euro would be a natural candidate for a prominent role.
A major obstacle to such development at present is clearly the European sovereign debt crisis. 
As we write, the crisis is far from settled and may in fact not have reached its climax. Whatever 
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the eventual outcome, more market turbulence is likely. While there is no statistical evidence 
yet that the euro debt crisis has altered the portfolio shares of global private and official asset 
holders,  or  has  affected  other  indicators  measuring  the  international  use  of  the  euro,  the 
present uncertainties are enough to discourage anybody from venturing into conjectures on 
further advancements of the euro’s cross border presence in the years to come.
While agreeing that caution is warranted, there are, we think, two important counterarguments. 
The first is that, just as one should not rule out less favourable scenarios, it is also plausible 
that the present crisis may trigger reforms that would not otherwise have been made and will, 
in the end, permanently strengthen the institutional foundation of the euro. The euro sovereign 
debt crisis could turn out to be a necessary catalyst for progress. This paper is not the place for 
a discussion of this scenario and its likelihood. But we note that such outcome would have 
several relevant historical precedents. In their overview of five well-established federations 
(US, Canada, Germany, Argentina and Brazil), Bordo, Merkiewicz and Jonung (2011) conclude 
that 
“…  institutional  developments  in  most  of  the  five  federations  were  driven  by  
exceptional events, often downturns in economic activity during deep crises… which  
affected in a fundamental way the institutions of the five federal states. In response to  
the economic crisis, central governments increased their power.”
The  strengthening  of  central  institutions  at  the  expense  of  regional  ones  in  these  five 
federations involved, first and foremost, fiscal policy and the financing of public debts. While 
these five examples refer to cases where an established political union pre-existed monetary 
and  fiscal  unification,  several  arguments  suggest  that  present-day  Europe  (where  many 
functions are already transferred at Union level and a common central bank exists) is more 
comparable to historical examples of national monetary unifications than to international ones 
(Bordo and Jonung, 1999). 
Our  second  argument  is  that  most  reforms,  enacted  or  under  consideration,  aimed  at 
strengthening the euro’s economic governance are also likely to promote its position in the 
IMS. There is, in other words, strong synergy between the internal stability of the euro and its 
external  attractiveness.  Therefore,  should  the  more  favourable  scenario  mentioned  above 
materialise, the euro will probably be well positioned to assume a growing role in a multipolar 
currency system. Let us consider the different aspects of this argument in some detail.
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001 and 2009) and Gourinchas and Rey (2005) have concluded, 
looking at detailed data on US balance sheets, that the dollar’s international role is linked to 
the  US  acting  in  many  ways  like  a  financial  intermediary,  issuing  liabilities  attractive  for 
international portfolio holders (mainly private liquid balances and official  reserve holdings) 
and investing in more risky assets. To extract the 'exorbitant privilege' the US banking sector 
performs a liquidity-creating and a maturity transformation function, much like a bank, for the 
rest of the world (as noted already by Kindleberger, 1965). In recent years this intermediation 
has  become  more  extreme,  as  the  demand  for  liquidity  by  international  investors  has 
increased while the lending side (equity and FDI investment, often in emerging economies) 
has become more risky. This interpretation seems to fit to some extent also the earlier case of 
the British pound; in the Gold Standard, and until later in the first half of the twentieth century, 
the  City  of  London  performed  financial  intermediation  by  supplying  liquid  assets  to 
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international investors (bank deposits, Treasury paper, etc) and financing, via trade credit, the 
vast international trade between the UK and its empire (Eichengreen, 2011, chapter 3).
The question arises of whether the financial and banking sector of the euro area can perform a 
similar  function,  and  what  the  conditions  are.  Will  the  reforms  in  the  area  of  economic 
governance recently undertaken or being discussed help in this direction?
Of central importance here is the stability, efficiency and integration of the euro-area banking 
and financial sector, including its governance and the availability of an effective safety net. 
The reforms enacted in 2010 go some way towards providing new and sounder regulatory and 
supervisory structures. In particular, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), an EU body of 
central  bankers  and  supervisors,  entrusted  with  the  responsibility  of  monitoring  systemic 
risks and making policy recommendations, should ensure regular and well informed oversight 
against the insurgence of systemic risks. At a more operational level, the introduction of new 
European supervisory agencies (respectively on banks,  markets and other  intermediaries) 
should  help  ensure  consistent  regulation  across  the  area  (a  level  playing  field)  and 
homogeneous  implementation  of  rules  (a  single  rulebook),  a  major  deficiency  that  the 
institutional structure of the early EMU years had left unresolved (Padoa-Schioppa, 2007).
This granted, much remains to be done. The new European supervisory structures need to be 
tested and will  acquire credibility and influence gradually, building on the limited statutory 
powers they have. This can only be achieved through consistent and successful performance 
in  the  field.  This  is  particularly  relevant  for  the  ESRB  which  does  not  possess  direct 
intervention powers but acts through non-binding recommendations. The interplay between 
the ESAs and the national supervisors, a complex web of cross country and cross-institutional 
interlinkages,  will  unavoidably  have  to  be  phased  in  gradually  and  by  trial-and-error.  In 
addition, there is an unresolved potential tension between two financial logics in Europe. One 
is financial integration associated with the internal market, the other is financial supervision 
associated with the single currency, with the tension coming from the fact that the former is an 
EU matter, whereas the latter has an important euro-area dimension as the crisis has shown. 
The  ESRB  and  the  ESAs  are  EU  rather  than  euro-area  bodies,  which  may  preclude  their 
evolution towards euro area supervisors.
A closely related issue regards financial integration,  ie the ability of the euro-area financial 
system  to  ensure  broadly  uniform  lending  and  borrowing  (risk-adjusted)  conditions  to  all 
market  participants,  especially  across  borders.  In  the  early  years  of  EMU  cross-border 
financial  integration,  measured  by  volumes  of  cross  border  flows  and  yield  spreads, 
progressed steadily but unevenly (more on money markets, less in other market segments; 
see the ECB’s Financial Integration in Europe, various issues). The financial crisis has impaired 
financial  integration  very  seriously;  at  the  time  of  writing  there  are parts  of  the  euro-area 
banking system and money markets that are cut out of regular market linkages and receive 
financing by the ECB, or else at drastically different conditions than the rest of the area. This 
has endangered the monetary policy transmission process, as often emphasised by the ECB, 
but  also  generated  uncertainty  and  opacity  in  market  conditions  within  and  across 
compartments  (interbank  funds,  bonds,  retail  banking  services),  constituting  a  factor  of 
discouragement for  international  investors.  The new supervisory and regulatory framework 
will  help  but  is  not  sufficient,  considering  in  particular  that  much  of  the  phenomenon 
originates from rising and volatile sovereign spreads (Angeloni, 2011).
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We regard the integration of sovereign bond markets as a first key condition to jointly restore 
financial stability in the euro area and to enhance the euro’s international role. A broad, liquid 
and integrated market for public sector benchmarks plays a key role in all  well-functioning 
financial  systems.  Official  wealth  holders  (central  banks and other  sovereign  institutions), 
covering  a  rising  share  of  global  funds  under  management  (check)  have  a  systematic 
preference for  low-risk instruments.  While the German Bund has fulfilled this  role to some 
extent, an area-wide liquid market, including benchmarks issued and guaranteed by European 
institutions, would contribute to financial integration (by improving the collateral pools) and to 
the attractiveness of the euro as an international store of value.
While the advantages of area-wide bond issuances (or bond guarantees) from the point of 
view of fostering European financial integration and promoting the international attractiveness 
of the euro are clear, the political and institutional conditions for their introduction, in amounts 
significantly beyond those already existing for specific purposes (like the issues by the EIB, 
the Commission or the EFSF) are complex and challenging. A discussion of them would lead us 
too far from our central theme. Suffice to say that an adequate legal and economic basis would 
require  new  Treaty  provisions,  including  strict  issuance  rules  and  limits  to  guarantee  the 
quality of the new instruments and to avoid free-riding.
The  second  condition  we  see  to  underpin  the  confidence  on  the  euro  both  internally  and 
internationally is to upgrade the euro area economic performance. Price stability in a strict 
sense  no  longer  seems  sufficient  in  this  respect;  real  sector  performance  will  be  equally 
important.  In the first decade of the euro, progress has been achieved in making euro area 
labour markets more responsive and in securing a reduction of unemployment rates (ECB, 
2008).  But this has not prevented growing competitiveness gaps and external disequilibria 
across euro area countries. Real economic performance gaps across countries increasingly 
coincide with differentials in sovereign credit risks and in financial sector risks. The euro area 
has agreed on a new surveillance framework, the Excessive Imbalance Procedure, with the aim 
of triggering structural policy responses as a result of monitoring of national developments 
and  peer  pressure.  The  challenge  will  be,  once  again,  implementation:  peer  pressure  can 
easily  lose  force  and  political  bargaining  produce  laxity,  as  the  experience  of  the  SGP 
demonstrates. If achieved, better and more even-handed economic performance would also 
improve the chances the euro area may successfully perform the intermediation role that, we 
have seen, is proper of countries that issue international currencies. Such role requires a pool 
of  investment  opportunities,  both  domestically  or  across  borders.  A  strong  banking  sector 
would hardly prevail in a weak euro area economy.
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6. Conclusions
The reasoning we have developed supports three conclusions.
First, the IMS is changing at an accelerating pace, partly due to the influence of the financial 
crisis. The stable equilibrium that prevailed for decades, characterised by a dominant US dollar 
and the lack of plausible alternatives, is no longer there.
Second,  this  situation  creates  opportunities  and  risks  for  the  system  as  a  whole  and  for 
individual currencies. It seems likely that the next decades will witness the emergence of a 
multipolar IMS, where the dollar will continue to play a crucial role but other currencies will also 
occupy a key role. It also seems likely that the Chinese RMB will, sooner or later, be one of the 
key currencies.
Third, the prospects for the euro are less clear but by no means sombre. As a result of the 
sovereign debt crisis,  which has exposed some fundamental  institutional  weaknesses, the 
euro finds itself in a sort of knife’s edge situation: either regress or advance, both internally 
and  internationally.  The  reforms  needed  to  provide  the  euro  with  stable  institutional 
foundation  largely  coincide  in  our  view  with  those  likely  to  foster  its  international  use. 
Stability, efficiency and integration of the banking and financial system are crucial conditions 
for  both  internal  and  international  viability  and  will  require  further  reform  of  the  financial 
supervisory framework, a broad and liquid sovereign bond market and structural reforms on 
the real side of the economy. The coming months will  tell  whether the euro area is able to 
demonstrate the political cohesion and leadership necessary for such steps to materialise. If it 
does,  internal  stabilisation  of  the  euro  will  be  achieved  and  is  likely  to  be  matched  by  a 
growing international role.
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